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(Revive China Society) in or before 1895, the T'ung Meng Hui (Common Alliance) in 1905, the Chung-hua Komintang (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in 1914, and the Chung-kuo Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1919 -- were the principal channels of Chinese revolutionary endeavor in those years. In his travels about the world, he solicited funds from overseas Chinese and arranged for material aid from French and Japanese government representatives to finance a series of uprisings. He had a great part in the planning and leadership of most of the revolutionary attempts made in China between 1895 and his death in 1925, with the exception of the 1911 outbreak that overthrew the Manchu regime.

His[1] most lasting influence, however, was as a theoretician. Sun's thinking was cast in a western mold but was ingrained with traditional ideas. This was a reflection of his early training in the classics, overlaid with a higher education in western schools, an adult life lived outside China, largely in Europe and American, and extensive reading in the writings of western social, political, and economic thinkers.

The result was a syncretic, propagandistic doctrine that never reached the stage of logical systemization and planning. Its main features are: the Three People's Principles (San-min Chu-i) -- nationalism, democracy and improved livelihood; the three-stage attainment of responsible government -- military conquest and dictatorship, party tutelage, and democracy; and the five-power constitution, adding an examination and censorate branch to the tripartite western

[1] [i.e. Sun Yat-sen -- Analyst]

system of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They are still the foundation of the Kuomintang on Formosa. 829

Sun's will exhorting his comrades to attain these and other principles he had worked out was read every Monday morning to the school children and officials throughout China during the ascendancy of the Kuomintang on the Mainland. The short-lived alliance with the Soviet Union, negotiated by Sun after being rebuffed by the West when he sought material and financial aid in building a strong China following World War II,[1] has put Sun in the Communist camp as well. His birthday and death are still officially observed and commemorated by the new regime. In his New Democracy, written in 1940, Mao Tse-tung placed himself in line as the heir to, and completer of, the revolutionary work, which the bourgeois Sun Yat-sen had initiated.[35] 668

H. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei

Just below Sun stood Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei. Both men were eager for power and 665

35. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," Sharaf Athar Ali, tr., reproduced in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III, Communism in China, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 67-91, and especially pp. 80-84.

1 [errata: should be World War I.--Analyst]

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←on the willingness and ability of the family 554
to support him during a long period of study. 596
A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the examinations was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaining peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It

The laws of imperial China provided heavy punishments for violations of these norms; the most heinous crimes were those against hsiao, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feelings" [jen-ching] and for the specific circumstances sourrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official," which expresses disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take in account "human feelings."[5] The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus.

In traditional China goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This notion sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

5. Ruth Benzel and John Weakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia University Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

6. Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. translation in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is"...to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society."[6] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[7] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[8]

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage" of the society into which he is born has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create a favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is differ-

7. J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, No. 20 (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

8. Liu Shao-ch'i, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in a symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China, University of Chicago Press, early 1956.

ent: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality..."[9]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (a phrase from the Analects of Confucius), that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He "does nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles, "(a restatement of the late Confucian

9. Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, op. cit., p. 110. Nivison, op. cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

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deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior. 155

B. Time, Change, and Causation

In traditional China, time and change were regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was seen not as the end of the line but as a return to childhood, not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When the empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided."[17] 829

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern Western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbooks, Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change is typically and authoritatively ex-

17. San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

pressed by Liu Shao-ch'i: 829

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...." [18]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect.[19] Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night. Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results. 829 812

The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

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18. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

19. Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

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C. Work and Leisure

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In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[20] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

829

The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction. The son was to submit unquestioningly to his father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial, and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family.

In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrates of the imperial bureaucracy was often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People " To reciprocate the

20. Ibid., pp. 37-40.

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care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[21]

These were the patterns of authority to which the individual was subject. His personality was formed within the family; his status in society was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system--particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was held responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned

21. The Classic of Filial Piety says, "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balázs, Le Traité Juridique du Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

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The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood. 829

When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[25] 178 596

The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations. 156

The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its

25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

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inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these measures are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories of young "heroes" who have broken away -- sometimes denouncing their "reactionary" fathers -- and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

"Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[25]

The brotherhood-friendship pattern among top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken

25. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

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on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song: 829

> The great leader is like a father.
> Mao Tse-tung educates us....[26]

Another praises his paternal care for his people:

> In his loving care for the people
> He surpasses that of their own
> fathers and mothers.[27]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

> The northern pole star in the sky-
> In China, Mao Tse-tung --
> Saving Mankind,
> Loving little children.
> He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[28]

As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the

26. From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

27. From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao Chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs], Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

28. From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan- she, 1950, p. 24.

family. A labor heroine is described as "a good daughter of the Party."[29] A song says, 829

Our great fatherland-
We should pay it the same filial
reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[30]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades", and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[31] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[32] In illness one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family. 596

29. Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

30. In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yangtze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

31. Cf. Lindbeck, op. cit., pp. 140-41.

32. The poem "Wen Pao-pao" ["Ask Baby"] appeared in a textbook for the lower primary grades in 1950. It has the baby asking various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task, hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.